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Introduction
“Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry” is perhaps the best summary of Sapir’s approach to 
what would become known as the ‘culture and personality’ movement in anthropology. But this 
brief, rich, and intelligent essay is more then that. It is also a statement about the nature of 
culture, the role of human agency in culture, and the complex, differentiated nature of culture. It 
is a remarkable piece that demonstrates the incredible clarity and sophistication of Sapir’s 
thought.
Sapir begins his essay discussing anthropology’s main problem: anthropologists claim to 
study intersubjectively held beliefs, but always do so through the testimony of individuals -- and 
often, only one or two key informants. But can we generalize about what ‘The Haida’ believe on 
the basis of talking to one Haida person? What is the relationship between a single individual’s 
belief and the culture of the group as a whole?
He then moves on to the flaws of psychiatry. Psychiatry has never located the organic basis of 
the mental illness it claims to treat, and clearly lacks the efficacy of other branches of medicine. 
Sapir claims this is because human relationships, rather than biological constitution, are the 
source of ‘mental’ illness: the death of a loved one causes depression, abuse as a child makes one 
paranoid, and so on. Indeed, social relationships can produce ‘purely organic’ (biological) 
illnesses -- for instance, job stress at work can lead to an upset stomach. To be effective, then, 
psychiatry must understand these relationships. 
Sapir then criticizes the Freudians for arguing that the mentally ill regress to the mental level 
of primitive people. This can’t be true, says Sapir, since all human beings share the same basic 
psychological makeup. Rather, he claims, anthropology is valuable to psychiatry because it 
shows that the definition of ‘normal’ varies within and across cultures and enables a more 
accurate and generalizable theory of culture and personality.
Sapir then enters into a remarkable and dense discussion of the nature of culture itself, a 
discussion which anticipates much of the argument of Berger and Luckmann’s The Social 
Construction of Reality by forty years. He begins by claiming that we cannot speak of the 
opposition of ‘individual’ to ‘society’ since ‘society’ is not a real thing, but an abstraction made 
by anthropologists to cover a wide range of concrete behavior. What we call ‘a culture’ or ‘a 
group’ is a rough and imprecise shorthand for a poorly defined group of people united by a label 
(‘Republicans’ or ‘the poor’) or by geography (‘New Yorkers’ or ‘The South’).  All cultures -- if 
we still wish to speak of them as bounded at all -- are internally heterogenous. A physicist at 
Harvard has a different stock of knowledge than the bartender who works across the street from 
the university. Even if cultural knowledge is shared, the psychological emphasis placed on it may 
vary. A businessman and an actress might both know the plot of Hamlet, but for one of them it is 
irrelevant to daily affairs, while to another it is central. Neither of them cares about how they 
both intuitively produce grammatical sentence, even though this may be central for the 
anthropologist studying them. 
To understand the relationship of personality to culture, we must pinpoint who specifically 
we are speaking off, and put the individual in the context of the actual people with whom he has 
relationships. The key is locating the the concrete social relationships that surround a person. 
Rather than assume that ‘individuals’ ‘adjust’ to ‘societal norms’ we must study how social life 
just is the process of people reacting to each other and the relationships they have with each 
other. This approach to culture and personality anticipates an empirically rigorous and 
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conceptually careful approach to the study of social process, one that differs in its subtlety from 
some of the excesses that were to mar the more simplistic segments of the culture and personality 
movement which gained power in the 1930s and 1940s. It is not too much to say, therefore, that 
Sapir was truly ahead of his time.
❀
This version of “Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry” is substantially complete, and has 
only been lightly edited for clarity. Unlike many of his contemporaries -- Kroeber and Lowie for 
instance -- Sapir’s prose lacks lazy digressions. It is, on the contrary, very carefully written, often 
to a fault. In order to make this article easier for introductory audiences to read, I have often 
removed the many clauses that Sapir uses to hedge his claims. I have also occasionally removed 
extra examples in those cases where Sapir has used three, when one would do. Hopefully this 
will result in a cleaner read which nonetheless preserves the flavor and intensity of Sapir’s prose. 
If the reader’s appetite is whetted for the full piece (as I hope it will be), they can find it on the 
Internet.
I hope that this paper, like the others in this series, will help present anthropological theory in 
a form that is accessible to everyone. There is today a tremendous amount of material which is 
open access, but it is difficult to find, inconvenient to read, and many people do not know where 
to start looking for it. By curating a selection of important open access work, I hope to make 
open access resources better known and to raise awareness of the actual history of 
anthropological theory.
-R
11 Mar 2014
Honolulu
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Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry
by Edward Sapir
Before we try to establish a more intimate relation between cultural anthropology and 
psychiatry, it will be well to emphasize the apparent differences of subject matter and purpose 
which separate them. Cultural anthropology has emphasized the group and its traditions in 
contradistinction to individual variations of behavior. It aims to discover the generalized forms of 
action, thought and feeling which, in their complex interrelatedness, constitute the culture of a 
community. [Cultural anthropology thinks] of the individual as a more or less passive carrier of 
tradition or, to speak more dynamically, as the infinitely variable actualizer of ideas and of 
modes of behavior which are implicit in the structure and tradition of a given society. It is what 
all the individuals of a society have in common in their mutual relations which is the true subject 
matter of cultural anthropology. If the testimony of an individual is set down as such, it is not 
because of an interest in the individual himself as a matured and single organism of ideas but in 
his typicality for the community as a whole.
There are many statements in our ethnological monographs which, for all that they are 
presented in general terms, really rest on the authority of a few individuals, or even of one 
individual, who have had to bear testimony for the group as a whole. [T]he cultural 
anthropologist always hopes that the individual informant is near enough to the understandings 
of his society to report them duly, thereby implicitly eliminating himself as a factor in the 
method of research. All realistic field workers in native custom and belief are aware of the 
dangers of such an assumption and efforts are made to "check up" statements received from 
single individuals. This is not always possible, however, and our monographs present a 
kaleidoscopic picture of varying degrees of generality, often within the covers of a single 
volume. Thus, that the Haida Indians of Queen Charlotte Islands were divided into two exogamic 
phratries, the Eagles and the Ravens, is a statement which could be elicited from any normal 
Haida Indian. It has the same degree of impersonality that characterizes the statement that the 
United States is a republic governed by a President. The fundamental patterns are relatively clear 
and impersonal. 
Yet in many cases we are not so fortunate as in the case of fundamental outlines of political 
organization or of kinship terminology or of house structure. What shall we do, for instance, with 
the cosmogonic system of the Bella Coola Indians of British Columbia? The five superimposed 
worlds which we learn about in this system not only have no close parallels among the other 
tribes of the Northwest Coast area but have not been vouched for by any informant other than the 
one individual from whom Boas obtained his information. Is this cosmogonic system typical 
Bella Coola religious belief? Is it individual fantasy construction or is it a peculiar individual 
elaboration on the basis of a simpler cosmogonic system which belongs to the community as a 
whole? In this instance the individual note obtrudes itself somewhat embarrassingly. In the main, 
however, the cultural anthropologist believes or hopes that such disquieting interruptions to the 
impersonality of his thinking do not occur frequently enough to spoil his science.
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Psychiatry is an offshoot of the medical tradition and aims to diagnose, analyze, and cure 
those behavior disturbances of individuals which show as serious deviations from the normal 
attitude of the individual. The psychiatrist specializes in "mental" diseases as the dermatologist 
specializes in the diseases of the skin or the gynecologist concerns himself with diseases peculiar 
to women. The great difference between psychiatry and other medical disciplines is that while 
the latter have a definite bodily locus to work with and have been able to define and perfect their 
methods by diligent exploration of the limited and tangible area of observation assigned to them, 
psychiatry is apparently doomed to have no more definite locus than the total field of human 
behavior in its more remote or less immediately organic sense. The conventional companionship 
of psychiatry and neurology seems to be little more than a declaration of faith by the medical 
profession that all human ills are, at last analysis, of organic origin. It is an open secret, however, 
that the neurologist's science is one thing and the psychiatrist's practice another. [P]sychiatrists 
have been forced to be content with an elaborate array of clinical pictures, with terminological 
problems of diagnosis, and with such thumb rules of clinical procedure as seem to offer some 
hope of success in the handling of actual cases. It is no wonder that psychiatry tends to be 
distrusted by its sister disciplines within the field of medicine and that the psychiatrists 
themselves, worried by a largely useless medical training and secretly exasperated by their 
inability to apply the strictly biological part of their training to their peculiar problems, tend to 
magnify the importance of the biological approach in order that they may not feel that they have 
strayed away from the companionship of their more illustrious brethren.
These insurgent psychiatrists, among whom Freud must be reckoned the most courageous 
and the most fertile in ideas, feel that many of the so-called nervous and mental disorders can be 
looked upon as the logical development of systems of ideas and feelings which have grown up in 
the experience of the individual and which have an unconscious value for him as the symbolic 
solution of profound difficulties that arise in an effort to adjust to his human environment. The 
morbidity that the psychiatrist has to deal with seems to be not a morbidity of organic segments 
but of experience itself. His attempts to explain a morbid suspiciousness of one's companions by 
the functioning of the endocrine glands may be no more to the point than to explain the habit of 
swearing by the absence of a few teeth or by a poorly shaped mouth.
[P]sychiatry is moving away from its historic position of a medical discipline that is 
chronically unable to make good to that of a discipline that is compelled to attack fundamental 
problems of psychology and sociology. The locus, then, of psychiatry turns out not to be the 
human organism but the more intangible, and yet more intelligible, world of human relationships 
and ideas that such relationships bring forth. Those students of medicine who see in these trends 
little more than a return to the old mythology of the "soul" are utterly unrealistic, for they assume 
that all experience is but the mechanical sum of physiological processes lodged in isolated 
individuals. This is no more defensible a position than the naively metaphysical contention that a 
table or chair or hat or church can be intelligibly defined in terms of their molecular and atomic 
constitution. 
That A hates B or hopelessly loves B or is jealous of B or is mortally afraid of B or hates him 
in one respect and loves him in another can result only from the complications of experience. If 
we work out a gradually complicating structure of morbid relationships between A and B and, by 
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successive transfers, between A or B and the rest of the human world, we discover behavior 
patterns that are none the less real and even tragic for not being attributable to some weakness of 
the nervous system. This does not mean that weakness of a strictly organic character may not 
result from a morbidity of human relationships. Such an organic theory would be no more 
startling than to maintain that a that a secret fear may impair one's digestion. There are, indeed, 
signs that psychiatry, slowly and painfully delivering itself from the somatic superstitions of 
medicine, may take its revenge by attempts to "mentalize" large sections of medical theory and 
practice. The future alone can tell how much of these psychological interpretations of organic 
disease is sound doctrine or a new mythology.
There is reason, then, to think that while cultural anthropology and psychiatry have distinct 
problems to begin with, they must, at some point, join hands in a highly significant way. That 
culture is a superorganic, impersonal whole is a useful methodological principle to begin with 
but becomes a serious deterrent to the more dynamic study of the genesis and development of 
cultural patterns because these cannot be realistically disconnected from those organizations of 
ideas and feelings which constitute the individual. The ultimate methodological error of the 
student of personality is less obvious than the error of the student of culture but is all the more 
insidious for that reason. Mechanisms which are unconsciously evolved by the neurotic or 
psychotic are by no means closed systems imprisoned within the biological walls of isolated 
individuals. They are tacit commentaries on the validity or invalidity of the intimate implications 
of culture for the adjustment processes of given individuals. We are not, therefore, to begin with 
a contrast between social patterns and individual behavior, but rather, to ask what is the meaning 
of culture in terms of individual behavior and whether the individual can be looked upon as the 
effective carrier of the culture of his group. As we follow tangible problems of behavior rather 
than problems set by recognized disciplines, we discover the field of social psychology, which is 
not a whit more social than it is individual and which is the mother science from which stem both 
the abstracted impersonal problems [of] the cultural anthropologist and the almost impertinently 
realistic explorations [of] the psychiatrist. What passes for individual psychology is little more 
than an ill-assorted melange of bits of physiology and of studies of highly fragmentary modes of 
behavior which have been artificially induced by the psychologist. This abortive discipline seems 
to be able to arrive at no integral conceptions of either individual or society and one can only 
hope that it will eventually surrender all its problems to physiology and social psychology.
Cultural anthropology has not been neglected by psychiatry. The psychoanalysts have made 
extensive use of the data of cultural anthropology to gather evidence in support of their theories 
of the supposed "racial inheritance of ideas" by the individual. Neurotic and psychotic, through 
the symbolic mechanisms which control their thinking, are believed to regress to a more 
primitive state of mental adjustment which is supposed to be preserved for our observation in the 
institutions of primitive peoples. In some undefined way the cultural experiences which have 
been accumulated by primitive man are believed to be unconsciously handed on to his more 
civilized progeny. Hence, we are told, it is very useful to study the culture of primitive man. The 
searching clinical investigation into the symbolisms of the neurotic recovers for us, on a modern 
and highly disguised level, what lies but a little beneath the surface among the primitives, who 
are still living under an archaic psychological regime.
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It is exceedingly doubtful if many cultural anthropologists welcome the spirit in which 
psychoanalysts appreciate their data. The cultural anthropologist can make nothing of the 
hypothesis of the racial unconscious nor is he disposed to allow an immediate psychological 
analysis of the behavior of primitive people in any other sense than that which is allowable for 
our own culture. He believes that it is as illegitimate to analyze totemism in terms of the peculiar 
symbolisms discovered or invented by the psychoanalyst as it would be to analyze the most 
complex forms of modern social behavior in these terms. And he is disposed to think that if the 
resemblances between the neurotic and the primitive are more than fortuitous it is not because of 
a cultural atavism but simply because all human beings are, at rock bottom, psychologically 
primitive, and there is no reason why a significant unconscious symbolism which gives 
substitutive satisfaction to the individual may not become socialized on any level of human 
activity.
The service of cultural anthropology to psychiatry is not as mysterious as psychoanalytic 
mysticism would have us believe. It is of a much simpler and healthier sort. Cultural 
anthropology has the healthiest of all scepticisms about the validity of the concept "normal 
behavior". It cannot deny the useful tyranny of the normal in a given society but it believes the 
external form of normal adjustment to be an exceedingly elastic thing. It is very doubtful if the 
normalities of any primitive society are nearer the hypothetical responses of an archaic type of 
man than the normalities of a modern Chinese or Scotchman. One may even wonder whether 
they are not tangibly less so. It would be more than a joke to turn the tables and to suggest that 
the psychoanalysis of an over-ritualized Pueblo Indian or Toda might denude him sufficiently to 
set him ''regressing" to the psychologically primitive status of an American professor. The 
psychoanalyst has confused the archaic in the conceptual or theoretical psychologic sense with 
the archaic in the literal chronological sense. Cultural anthropology is not valuable because it 
uncovers the archaic in the psychological sense. It is valuable because it is constantly 
rediscovering the normal. For the psychiatrist and for the student of personality this is of the 
greatest importance, for personalities are not conditioned by a generalized process of adjustment 
to "the normal" but by the necessity of adjusting to the greatest possible variety of idea patterns 
and action patterns according to the accidents of birth and biography.
The so-called culture of a group of human beings, as it is treated by the cultural 
anthropologist, is essentially a systematic list of all the socially inherited patterns of behavior 
which may be illustrated in the actual behavior of all or most of the individuals of the group. The 
true locus of these processes which, when abstracted into a totality, constitute culture is not 
society, for the term "society" is itself a cultural construct which is employed by individuals who 
stand in significant relations to each other in order to help them in the interpretation of certain 
aspects of their behavior. The true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals 
and, on the subjective side, in the world of meanings which each one of these individuals may 
unconsciously abstract for himself from his participation in these interactions. Every individual 
is, then a representative of at least one sub-culture. Frequently, he is a representative of more 
than one sub-culture, and the degree to which the socialized behavior of any given individual can 
be abstracted from the generalized culture of a single group varies enormously from person to 
person.
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It is impossible to think of any set of cultural patterns which can, in the literal sense of the 
word, be referred to society as such. There are no facts of political organization or family life or 
religious belief or magical procedure or technology or aesthetic endeavor which are coterminous 
with society or with any mechanically defined segment of society. The fact that John Doe is 
registered in some municipal office as a member of such and such a ward only vaguely defines 
him with reference to those cultural patterns which are conveniently assembled under "municipal 
administration." The psychological and the cultural realities of John Doe's registration may vary 
enormously. If John Doe is paying taxes on a house which is likely to keep him a resident of the 
ward for the rest of his life and if he also happens to be in personal contact with a number of 
municipal officers, ward classification may easily become a symbol of his orientation in his 
world of meanings which is comparable to his definition as a father or as a frequent participant in 
golf. Ward membership, for such an individual, may easily precipitate itself into many visible 
forms of behavior. The ward system and its functions, real or supposed, may for such a John Doe 
assume an impersonal and objective reality which is comparable to the objective reality of rain or 
sunshine.
But there is sure to be another John Doe, perhaps a neighbor of the first, who does not even 
know that the town is divided into wards and that he is enrolled in one of them and that he has 
certain duties and privileges connected with such enrollment. While the municipal office 
classifies these two John Does in exactly the same way and while there is a theory that ward 
organization is an entirely impersonal matter to which all members of a given society must 
adjust, it is rather obvious that such a manner of speech is a metaphor. The cultures of these two 
individuals are as significantly different, on the given level and scale, as though one were the 
representative of Italian culture and the other of Turkish culture. Such differences of culture 
never seem as significant as they really are; partly because in the workaday world of experience 
they [do] not emerge into sharp consciousness, partly because the economy of interpersonal 
relations and the friendly ambiguities of language reinterpret for each individual all behavior in 
the terms of those meanings which are relevant to his own life. The concept of culture, as it is 
handled by the cultural anthropologist, is necessarily something of a statistical fiction and it is 
easy to see that the social psychologist and the psychiatrist must eventually induce him to 
carefully reconsider his terms. It is not the concept of culture which is subtly misleading but the 
metaphysical locus to which culture is generally assigned.
Clearly, not all cultural traits are of equal importance for the development of personality. 
Some modes of behavior and attitude are pervasive and compelling beyond the power of even 
the most isolated individual to withstand or reject. Such patterns would be, for example, the 
symbolisms of affection or hostility; the overtones of emotionally significant words; certain 
fundamental implications of the economic order; much, but by no means all, of those 
understandings and procedures which constitute the law of the land. Patterns of this kind are 
compulsive for the vast majority of human beings but the degree of compulsiveness is in no 
simple relation to the official significance of these patterns. Thus, the use of an offensive word 
may be of negligible importance from a legal standpoint but may, psychologically considered, 
have a repelling potency that far transcends the significance of so serious a behavior pattern as, 
say, embezzlement. A culture as a whole cannot be said to be adequately known for purposes of 
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personality study until the varying degrees of compulsiveness which attach to its many aspects 
are definitely understood. No doubt there are cultural patterns which tend to be universal, not 
only in form but in psychological significance, but it is very easy to be mistaken in these matters 
and to impute equivalences of meaning which do not truly exist.
There are still other cultural patterns which are real and compelling only for special 
individuals or groups of individuals and are as good as non-existent for the rest of the group. 
Such, for instance, are the ideas, attitudes and modes of behavior which belong to specialized 
trades. The dairyman, the movie actress, the laboratory physicist, the party whip, have built up 
worlds which are anonymous or opaque to each other. There is much tacit mythology in such 
hugely complex societies as our own which makes it possible for the personal significance of 
sub-cultures to be overlooked. For each individual, the commonly accepted fund of meanings 
and values tends to be powerfully specialized by types of experience that are far from being the 
property of all men. If we consider that these specialized cultural participations are partly the 
result of contact with limited traditions and techniques, partly the result of identification with 
imposed groups as the family or the club, we see that the true psychological locus of a culture is 
the individual or a specifically enumerated list of individuals, not an economically or politically 
or socially defined group of individuals. "Individual" here means not simply a biologically 
defined organism, but that total world of form, meaning and implication of symbolic behavior 
which a given individual partly knows and directs, partly intuits and yields to, partly is ignorant 
of and is swayed by.
Still other cultural patterns may be termed marginal and while they may figure as important 
in the schema of a cultural theorist, [but] have little or no importance for the normal human 
being. Thus, the force of linguistic analogy which creates the plural ''unicorns" is a most 
important force for the linguistic analyst to be clear about, but it is obvious that the psychological 
imminence of that force may be less than the avoidance of obscene words, an avoidance which 
the linguist may look upon as marginal to his sphere of interests. In the same way, while such 
municipal subdivisions as wards are, from the standpoint of political theory, of the same order as 
state lines and even national lines, they are not psychologically so. They are psychologically 
related to such saturated entities as New York or "the South'' or Fifth Avenue or "the slums" as 
undeveloped property in the suburbs is economically related to real estate in the business heart of 
a great metropolis. Some of this cultural property is held as marginal by the vast majority of 
participants in the total culture, if we may still speak in terms of a "total culture". Others of these 
patterns are [marginal] only for certain individuals or groups of individuals. No doubt, to a 
movie actress the intense world of values which engages a physicist tends to be marginal in the 
same sense as a legal fiction or unactualized linguistic possibility may be marginal cultural 
property. A "hard-headed business man" may consign the movie actress and the physicist to two 
adjoining sectors, "lively" and "sleepy" respectively, of a marginal tract of "triviality". Culture 
varies infinitely, not only as to content but as to the distribution of psychologic emphases on the 
elements of this content. According to our scale of treatment, we have to deal with the cultures of 
groups and the cultures of individuals.
A personality is carved out by the subtle interaction of those systems of ideas which are 
characteristic of the culture as a whole, as well as of those systems of ideas which get established 
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for the individual through more special types of participation, with the physical and 
psychological needs of the individual organism, which cannot take over any of the cultural 
material that is offered in its original form but works it over more or less completely, so that it 
integrates with those needs. The more closely we study this interaction, the more difficult it 
becomes to distinguish society as a cultural and psychological unit from the individual who is a 
member of the society to whose culture he is required to adjust. No problem of social psychology  
can be phrased by starting with the contrast of the individual and his society. Nearly every 
problem of social psychology needs to consider the exact nature and implication of an idea 
complex, which we may look upon as the psychological correlate of the anthropologist's cultural 
pattern, to work out its relation to other idea complexes and what modifications it necessarily 
undergoes as it accommodates itself to these, and, above all, to ascertain the precise locus of such 
a complex. This locus is rarely identifiable with society as a whole, nor is it often lodged in the 
psyche of a single individual. Ordinarily the locus will be a substantial portion of the members of 
a community, each of them feeling that he is touching common interests so far as this particular 
culture pattern is concerned. We have learned that the individual in isolation from society is a 
psychological fiction. We have not had the courage to face the fact that formally organized 
groups are equally fictitious in the psychological sense, for geographically contiguous groups are 
merely a first approximation to the infinitely variable groupings of human beings to whom 
culture is actually to be credited as a matter of realistic psychology.
"Adjustment" is a superficial concept because it regards only the end product of individual 
behavior as judged from the standpoint of the requirements, real or supposed, of a particular 
society. In reality "adjustment" consists of two distinct and even conflicting types of process. It 
includes those accommodations to the behavior requirements of the group, but it includes just as 
significantly the effort to make felt in the opinions and attitudes of others that particular cosmos 
of ideas and values which has grown up in the experience of the individual. Ideally these two 
adjustment tendencies need to be compromised into behavior patterns which do justice to both 
requirements.
It is a dangerous thing for the individual to give up his identification with such cultural 
patterns as have come to symbolize for him his own personality integration. The task of external 
adjustment to social needs may require such abandonment on his part and consciously he may 
crave nothing more passionately, but if he does not wish to invite disharmony and inner 
weakness in his personality, he must see to it that every abandonment is made good by the 
acquisition of a psychologically equivalent symbolism. External observations on the adjustment 
processes of individuals are often highly misleading. The same types of behavior, judged 
externally, may have entirely distinct, even contradictory, meanings for different individuals. One 
may be a conservative out of fear or out of superb courage. A radical may be such because he is 
so secure in his psychic organization as to have no fear for the future, or, on the contrary, his 
courage may be merely the fantasied rebound from fear of the only too well known.
Strains which are due to this constant war of adjustment are by no means of equal intensity 
for all individuals. Systems of ideas grow up in endless ways, both within a so-called uniform 
culture and through the blending of so-called distinct cultures, and very different symbolisms and 
value emphases arise in the endless sub-cultures or private symbol organizations of the different 
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members of a group. Certain systems of ideas are more perilously exposed to the danger of 
disintegration than others. Even if it individual differences of an inherited sort are significantly 
responsible for mental breakdowns, such a "failure" in the life of an individual cannot be 
completely understood by the study of the individual's body and mind. Such a failure invites a 
study of his system of ideas as a more or less distinct cultural entity which has been vainly 
striving to maintain itself in a discouraging environment.
A psychosis, for instance, may be an index of the too great resistance of the individual to the 
forces that play upon him and, so far as his world of values is concerned, of the cultural poverty 
of his psychological environment. The more obvious conflicts of cultures in the modern world 
create an uneasiness which forms a fruitful soil for the eventual development of neurotic 
symptoms and mental breakdowns but they can hardly be considered sufficient to account for 
serious psychological derangements. These arise not on the basis of a generalized cultural 
conflict but out of specific conflicts of a more intimate sort, in which systems of ideas get 
attached to particular persons, or images of such persons, who play a decisive role in the life of 
the individual as representatives of cultural values.
The personal meaning of the symbolisms of an individual's subculture are constantly being 
reaffirmed by society or, at the least, he likes to think that they are. When they obviously cease to 
be, he loses his orientation and that strange instinct which in the history of culture has always 
tended to preserve a system of ideas from destruction, causes his alienation from an impossible 
world. Both the psychosis and the development of an idea or institution through the centuries 
manifest the stubbornness of idea complexes and their implications in the face of a material 
environment which is less demanding psychologically than physically. The mere problem of 
biological adjustment is comparatively simple. It is literally true that "man wants but little here 
below nor wants that little long". The trouble always is that he wants that little on his own terms. 
It is not enough to satisfy one's material wants, to have success in one's practical endeavors, to 
give and receive affection, or to accomplish any of the purposes laid down by psychologists and 
sociologists and moralists. Personality organizations, which at last analysis are psychologically 
comparable with the greatest cultures or idea systems, have as their first law of being their 
essential self-preservation, and all conscious attempts to define their functions or to manipulate 
their intention and direction are but the estimable rationalization of people who are wanting to 
"do things". Modern psychiatrists should be tolerant not only of varying personalities but of the 
different types of values which personality variations imply. Psychiatrists who are tolerant only 
in the sense that they refrain from criticizing anybody who is subjected to their care and who do 
their best to guide him back to the renewed performance of society's rituals may be good 
practical surgeons of the psyche. They are not necessarily the profoundly sympathetic students of 
the mind who respect the fundamental intent and direction of every personality organization.
Perhaps it is not too much to expect that a number of gifted psychiatrists may take up the 
serious study of exotic and primitive cultures, not in the spirit of meretricious voyaging in behalf 
of Greenwich Village nor to collect an anthology of psychoanalytic fairy tales, but in order to 
learn to understand, more fully than we can out of the resources of our own cultures, the 
development of ideas and symbols and their relevance for the problem of personality
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